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Abstract
We analyze a model in which agents’ decisions to enter or exit investments are
influenced from their individual and external parties’ transaction histories. Actual
investment outcomes are unknown to all participants until the end of decision
periods, but outcomes do change depending on the number of participating play-
ers in the market and the market’s current state of condition. In this particular
model, agents have access to external parties’ information from those who are
within their specific social network. Our study of limited information aggregation
mainly focuses on market responses to investors’ decisions of exiting the invest-
ment. With social structures complicating investment outcomes, we present a
model that describes how markets can enter relatively stable statuses long enough
for exiting participants to return, which brings the investment back to normal
conditions. Our model also supports previous studies that limited information
aggregation can cause the exogenous shock effect of global collapse.
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A SimpleModel of Metastable Market
1 Introduction
Network externalities affect the outcomes in markets by influencing participants’
decisions. Take investments in solar battery technology for example. As more
people invest, the stronger the scale effect becomes which reduces the unit cost
and increases the profit of every investor.
Now consider a risky situation that has a network externality and agents re-
peatedly investing into the market upon different entry periods. Jeitschko and
Taylor (2001) analyzed such a situation, but agents could only base their decisions
to invest or exit around individual investment outcomes. What was proven in
their AER paper was that a global economic collapse could occur even if the in-
vestment was in a state of Pareto-efficient equilibrium and could bring positive
returns. Yet, in the situation where an agent received a negative outcome, they
will assume other investors also experienced similar results and will most likely
exit the market without the intention of returning. In this situation, if multiple
investors exited, this would cause a domino effect of a simultaneous pullout
because the lesser the number of agents in the market, the more negative the
network externality becomes, causing more agents to exit as a result. Hence, even
an investor experiencing positive outcomes will be discouraged after some time,
and the simultaneous market collapse - in other words, avalanche - is inevitable
in this kind of model.
Though the conclusion of Jeitschko and Taylor’s paper accurately display how
an investment that does not allow information sharing between participants can
lead to investors simultaneously pulling out from a positive valued asset due to
the network externality effect, their model doesn’t acknowledge how investments
can also rebound from drops in economic activity by remaining in a relatively
weak status long enough for exiting investors to return. By examining an invest-
ment situation that has agents exiting and reentering the market at different entry
periods, we show a market that has multiple agents simultaneously exit the in-
vestment enter into a vulnerable status for a period of time and then re-stabilize
to a prosperous condition due to the exiting investors’ return. Furthermore, we
support the view of Jeitschko and Taylor (2001) by showing investments that cause
agents’ decisions to exit triggering a global collapse. With that being said, there
are countless of possibilities an investment can result in once network externali-
ties affect investors’ decisions. We specifically observe situations that allow the
transaction outcomes between specific parties to be shared - this could represent
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investments involving friends and family members or business groups. In this sit-
uation, investors that exit markets based on their initial negative outcome could
then draw two conclusions which would cause different effects to the market
activity: one, they are reconfirmed of their decision to exit from other players’
outcomes and will not reenter, leaving the investment in a vulnerable condition
that could cause future investors to exit and trigger a possible global collapse. Two,
they return to the market after observing their relatives’ gains, which could restore
the investment back to normal operating conditions. In this case of aggregate
information, the network externality is proven to cause either a full out market
collapse or the re-stabilization of the investment.
As reference, Gunay (2008) has previously linked information aggregation into
the coordination avalanche model of Jeitschko and Taylor (2001) and presented
how agents could update their information according to the shock and every other
player’s investment behavior of the previous period. Gunay’s model focused on
complete information aggregation which provides interesting results to agents’
decisions being made on the investment outcomes of the entire investment group.
However, our goal is to focus on a limited information aggregation model based
off of Jeitschko and Taylor’s (2001) avalanche model.
In this paper, we extend the model of Jeitschko and Taylor (2001) into a limited
information aggregation model to explain two basic features of a risky market with
repeated investment. First, investments can stay in a relatively vulnerable, yet
stable prosperous status for a lengthy period of time. Second, to analyze that what
caused market instability within a limited information aggregation investment
model, can also be leading factor of a full market collapse under the presence of a
small exogenous shock.
This is a Stag-Hunt game of multiple players: at the beginning of each decision
period τ, each player must decide whether to take a risky action of (investing) or
not (exiting), and these decisions will remain unchanged throughout the trans-
action periods until the following decision period. An investor who chooses to
exit the market will receive a payoff of zero. If the investor selects to invest in this
period, he will experience a probability p to win and a probability 1−p to lose
in every transaction periods until the following decision period. The outcome is
independent across players and over time.
There are three key characteristics in our model. Firstly, there exists limited
information aggregation. In particular, every investor can observe their own
investment outcome and transaction history as well as several other investors’
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within a social network. Investors can take use of the available information of the
last decision period to strategize at the beginning of decision periods.
Secondly, players are uncertain about the actual value of p. Investors can only
predict what the value of p will be based on their outcome and transaction histo-
ries. Specifically, in our paper, we assume that people only consider the outcome
history of the last decision period and ignore the outcome history ex ante, since
they believe that the probability of p changes with time, and previous outcome
records cannot serve as an accurate indicator of the next winning probability.
Lastly, there exists a network externality or complementarity of participants’
actions. In particular, as the number of active investors decreases, the profit of
successful investors drops as well. The expected return of investment depends on
both the number of active investors and the state of economic nature.
There are three fields of research that are mainly related to our work, namely
network externality, herding behavior and social network. The main difference
between our paper and the paper of Gunay (2008) is that we do not consider the
condition of complete information aggregation, but instead consider information
aggregation is shared through three different scales of social structure. This en-
ables our model to be applied into a variety of situations, adding to its complexity.
The second main difference is that we assume people will not rapidly change their
decisions in short periods of time. The third difference is that we recognize how a
small exogenous shock affects the market.
Jeitschko and Taylor (2001) conclude that market collapses can happen simply
out of fear. According to our case study on different social structures, markets
can also remain stable for relatively long periods of time due to information
aggregation. The degree of stability is largely determined on the structure of the
social network.
As for herding theory, for example, various papers focus on the information
cascade theory, one being Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992). This
paper in particular shows that information cascades occur when individuals have
made decisions following the behavior of their predecessors. The main difference
between their paper and ours is that they suggest individuals have a sequence in
making investment decisions. In many ways, our paper is similar to Bikhchandani,
Hirshleifer and Welch (1998) since we also agree that information cascades are
based on social learning experiences. However, the individual players in our
model not only focus on the entry and exiting behaviors of others, but also make
decisions based on information from their neighbors’ transaction outcomes.
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Lastly, in our model, the information exchange between different investors
depends on social structures in the market, which is related to models in literature
on the social network and social structure field. The work of Zollman (2008)
supports our assumption that limited information aggregation is a common
reality in investments and he used a similar approach of social structure to study
the effects of conformity.
A paper that highly complements ours is Acemoglu et al. (2010). They develop
a model that presents how information is exchanged in social networks. They test
when asymptotic learning comes into effect and how it influences the aggregate
welfare. The main difference between our paper and theirs is that they focus on
the existence of asymptotic learning and its effects on welfare whereas we focus
on the effect of network externalities on market coniditions.
Section 2 will be a brief introduction to the model we use in this paper. In
Section 3, we will analytical propose a mechanism to explain how the three char-
acteristics of our model can lead to a relatively stable status of an investment that
loses a number of participating players, but not the rapid collapse as predicted by
Jeitschko and Taylor (2001). In Section 4, we will propose a mechanism to explain
how a small exogenous shock that influences a limited number of investors in the
market can create a severe market collapse. In Section 5, we will turn to examine
the effect of different social topology structures amongst investors. Programming
methods are applied to simulate the mechanism of Section 3 and Section 4, and
we will discuss under which topology structure the market will reach its most
robust status. Brief concluding remarks will appear in Section 6.
2 Model
We assume that there exist M individual investors within a specific market named
{P1,P2, ...,PM }. Individual investors are risk neutral and aim to maximize their
expectation return, which is on an infinite timespan and the discount factor δ is
zero.
There are two types of periods in our model: a transaction period, t , and
a decision period, τ, which satisfies τ = kt ,k = 1,2, ...,n. At the beginning of
every decision period, each investor decides from an Action Set {I N ,OU T }, which
represents whether the investor enters the market or not. If OU T is chosen, the
agent receives a payoff of 0 in each transaction period, t = 1,2, ...,k within the
decision period τ. If an agent selects I N , he will face a W I N probability of p
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and LOSE probability of 1−p. The return U (m) is a function of m, which is the
number of investors that choose I N in the period τ, as shown below:
U (mτ)=
{
f ( mτM )− c if WIN
−c if LOSE
f (·) is a strictly increasing function that is defined on [0,1], where f (0) = 0,
f (1)= 1. c remains a constant variable that represents the fixed cost of transaction,
and c ∈ (0,1)
Another important element in our model is that investors cannot observe the
true value of the winning probability p. Instead, players’ decisions are based on
information from transaction histories that reveal previous win and lose rates to
estimate the winning probability p in the market. At the end of each decision
period investors update their belief of p based on the information they gained
from the last decision period, and all other aspects of the market condition is
freely accessible knowledge in the model.
Different from what is assumed by Jeitschko et al (2001), a key element of our
model is that each investor can observe the transaction history of a few selected
interrelated investors. For example, A and B are two investors in our model. If
B can observe the transaction history of A, we name that A is a sender of B , and
B is a receiver of A, and denote such a relation group as A → B . Specifically, if
transaction history is shared between A and B , i.e., A→B and B → A, we denote
it as A ↔ B and we name A as a friend of B, and likewise, B is a friend of A. For
an investor Pi that belongs to the set {P1,P2, ...,PM }, we denote Pi = Pi (si ,ri ). si
represents the number of investors submit their outcome to Pi , and ri denotes
the number of investors receiving information from Pi .
To ensure that there exists a Nash Equilibrium, all investors play I N during
the first decision period and we should consider the initial belief p. The expected
initial belief of p is denoted as p and p = E (p). As proven by Jeitschko et al (2001),
there should be p − c > 0 to ensure that all players enter the market in the first
round.
3 Market Structure - Relatively Stable Status
If an investor selects I N to enter the market, the agent’s expected rate of return
to the market depends on two factors: his believed value of p and the number of
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investors who also play I N in the same period. As shown in Model section, every
investor enters the market during the first decision period.
Let’s begin with a simple outline of our model. Consider an investor, A, whose
social network is shown below:
Figure3.1 An example of the social structure
After the first decision period, A will update his/her belief on probability p
according to their individual experience and from the related investors’ trans-
action information, i.e., C , D and E . In a particular case, if A experiences more
failure than success in the first period, it is possible that their level of pessimism
on the value of p will lessen because C , D and E received positive returns from
the market (i.e., A is influenced to select I N ). Of course, it is also possible that
even after taking others’ information into consideration, A will still believe that
the probability of p’s outcome will be too low and exits the market after the first
period. To extend this example into a more concrete situation, we formalize the
following stopping lemma:
Lemma 1. NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITION OF STOP.
Differentiating between investors, Pi ∈ {P1,P2, ...,PM }, who has the number of
si senders.After the first decision period, the necessary and sufficient condition that
he will select OUT is:
si∑
i=0
t=k∑
t=1
Ut (mτ)< 0
Then selecting OU T will be the dominate strategy to the investor Pi .
As shown in the previous section, the initial winning probability p is higher
than the fixed cost of transaction, c. Let B(n|k, p) be the binomial distribution
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with parameter k and p. B(n|k, p) acts as the probability of experiencing n or less
W I N s within k periods. Suppose that N is the largest integral that satisfies:
N (1− c)− [(si +1)k−N ]c < 0
Then, B(N |(si+1)k, p) represents the exiting probability of Pi with the mass of
si senders after the first decision period. The expected gross return to an investor
who selects I N in next decision period will drop to:
p f (1−B(N |(si +1)k, p))
In particular, if si equals to zero, the exiting possibility of Pi is then equals to
B(n|k, p). We can now formalize the exiting LEMMA:
Lemma 2. EXITING LEMMA
Suppose F (k)=B(N (k)|k, p), and we have 1> p > c and N (k)= bkcc, then:
(1) If N (k+1)=N (k), we have F (k+1)< F (k).
(2) If N (k+1)=N (k)+1, we have F (k+1)> F (k)
(3) limk→∞B(N (k)|k, p)→ 0
A brief proof is shown in Appendix.
LEMMA 2-(1), (3) illustrates that to a specific investor Pi , generally speaking,
the more information senders to Pi , the less possibility Pi will exit the market
after the first decision period (i.e., the market structure is more stable under the
circumstances of a social network). And LEMMA 2-(2) implies that there will
be fluctuations within this declining procedure because of the discontinuity of
binominal distribution, which is also clearly shown in Section 5.
Let’s trace this to the second decision period. As is shown in previous para-
graphs, after the first decision period, the expected number of investors that
choose OU T is:
O1 =
M∑
i=1
B(N |(si +1)k, p)
We are interested to examine whether the quitting number will increase or
not after this stage. Consider an investor in this market, Pi , who has the number
of s′i information senders and decides to quit the market in the second decision
period. Keep in mind, this investor cannot observe his own transaction outcome
in this period from selecting OU T . However, unlike Jeitschko and Taylor (2001),
Pi can still observe the outcome of the information senders and shape a belief of
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the winning probability p. Suppose that N ′ is the biggest integral that satisfies:
N ′[ f (1−B(N |(s′i +1)k, p))− c]− (si k−N )c < 0
Then, B(N ′|si k, p) represents the probability that the investor Pi will remain
in an OU T status after the second decision period. In this way, the expectation
number of investors that return to the market after the second decision period is:
R2 =
M∑
i=1
{B(N |(si +1)k, p)× [1−B(N ′|s′k, p)]}
Also presented is a mechanism that shows investors who quit the market in the
decision period of τ will return to the market with a possibility of 1−B(N ′|s′k, p)
In respect, there also may be investors who selected I N on the second decision
period that then decide to exit the market after the second stage. The expectation
number of new investors that exit the market after the second decision period is:
O2 =
M∑
i=1
{[1−B(N |(si +1)k, p)]×B(N ′|(s′+1)k, p)}
Denote ∆O2 as the expected difference between the number of investors that
select OU T after the second decision period and the number of investors that
select OU T after the first decision period. We now have:
∆O2 =
M∑
i=1
{[1−B(N |(si+1)k, p)]×B(N ′|(s′+1)k, p)−B(N |(si+1)k, p)×[1−B(N ′|s′k, p)]}
∆O2 > 0
We can also define ∆Oi , i = 1,2, ...,n in this way. It appears difficult to ana-
lytically solve the above function of ∆Oi . However, the following LEMMA shows
essential features of ∆Oi .
Lemma 3. CHARACTERS OF Del t aOi
(1) To any given integral si , if we have p < c, ∆Oi < 0
(2) limsi→∞∆Oi = 0
Though LEMMA 3 shows that the predicted number of investors who select
OU T will increase as time goes on, we still say that the market can reach a relative
stable status under the assumption of limited information aggregation. Compare
with O1, ∆O2 is a high order quantity and it is possible that the sum of the series
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{∆O1,∆O2, ...,∆Oi } converges. Remarkably, in Section 5, we will show that when
f(·) is not entirely convex, the market will not collapse in only a few periods,
instead, the number of active investors will fluctuate around a certain equilibrium
value.
4 Market CollapseMechanism
In this section, we will propose a market collapse mechanism that occurs under a
small exogenous shock. There are many situations where a small shock impacts
an entire market. For example, a sudden hurricane might affect the supply of
crude oil and many investors will suffer a great loss, and a drop in market demand
will devastate suppliers heavily during the period. In our model, we define a shock
as an exogenous negative factor that makes the winning probability p of all the
investors that it affects drop to zero, which lasts for one decision period.
We use a simple example to explain the collapse mechanism in our model.
This market is consisted of 5 investors, and their social networks are shown below:
Figure4.1 An example of the social structure
Before the first decision period, all participants in the market select I N . We
simply assume that A suffers from a shock during the first period, which, as
defined in previous paragraph, makes the winning probability of A drop to zero.
Let B(n|k, p) represents the probability of experiencing n or less W I N s in k
periods and B(n|k, p) is a binominal distribution with parameter k and probability
p. Suppose NA is the biggest integral that satisfies:
NA(1− c)− (4k−NA)c < 0
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Then, B(NA|3k, p) represents the possibility of A exiting after the first deci-
sion period. That makes B(n|k, p) a strictly decreasing function of k. Therefore,
with the shock, the exiting probability of A, B(NA|3k, p), will be significantly
higher than the exiting probability of A without an exogenous shock, known as
B(NA|4k, p). Specifically, if NA < 3k, we have B(NA|3k, p)= 1 and A is surely to
exit the market after the first decision period.
Consider the other investors who also receive the same investment outcome
as A in this market, namely, B and D. Both B and D have only one sender and
denote NBD as the largest integral that satisfies:
NBD (1− c)− (2k−NBD )c < 0
Similar to A, B(NBD |k, p) represents the exiting probability of B and D after
the first decision period, and we have: B(NBD |k, p)<B(NBD |2k, p), which means
that the probability of B and D exiting rises even though they did not experience
the exogenous shock of A. We denote this phenomenon as “Pass Effect” (i.e., The
receivers of A experience the shock through A’s outcome). This is the first step of
our Collapse Model. From this example, we can formalize a LEMMA of Pass Effect
without any further proof:
Lemma 4. PASS EFFECT
Consider an investor Pi (si ,ri ) who receives a shock.
(1) The quitting probability of Pi rises from B(N |(si +1)k, p) to B(N |si k, p), if k
is large enough.
(2) The set of all receivers of Pi is {Pr 1,Pr 2, ...,Pr i }. To a certain receiver Pr j (sr j ,rr j ),
j ∈ 1,2, ..., i , the quitting probability of Pr j rises from B(N |(si+1)k, p) to B(N |si k, p).
The second step of our Collapse Model is that the increased numbers of exiting
members causes a further negative network externality to active investors. As is
shown in LEMMA 3, a shock of small proportion can be passed to a larger scale
of investors, which will further influence their probability of quitting the market
at the next decision period. If too many investors fear playing I N in the second
decision period, an avalanche can occur because the negative network externality
brought about from the absence of cautious investors. Typically, a collapse effect
will occur 3 to 5 decision periods after receiving the initial exogenous shock. The
following example helps to illustrate how a market collapse happens, and exam-
ines our assumption of how limited information aggregation helps in accelerating
the collapse procedure.
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Example 4.1. A Dig Gold Game
Consider a dig gold game with 100 participants. The more participants taking
part in this game, the higher the profit every participant will gain from a successful
digging (because of the scale effect). Of course in a real world there will also be
a crowding externality as is discussed in Clark and Polborn (2006), yet we ignore
such effect to simplify this example. The fixed cost of every digging is c = 0.2 and a
successful digging brings a profit of 0.5p, where p denotes the proportion of people
who join into the digging game. After ten digging periods, all participants will be
allowed to decide whether to stay in the game or not. To simplify the example, we
simply assume that every participant was successful 5 times and lost 5 times in
the first round. Unfortunately, the digging equipment of 10 participants suffers
from a temporary breakdown so that those players cannot receive any return in the
first stage. We consider three different information sharing situations among the
participants in this game.
(1) No one shares their own outcome with others. In this situation, the 10
unfortunate participants receive a return of −2, who will likely quit the game after
the first stage. It is easy to know that the other 90 participants receive an outcome
of 0.5. In the second round of the dig gold game, since the proportion of active
participants falls to 90%, the return also falls to 0.25 for each person, but they still
have enough motivation to stay in this game since the expectation return is positive.
(2) Every player’s outcome information is completely shared among all the
participants. In this situation, the 10 participants with the equipment breakdown
receive a return of−2 after the first stage, and the other 90 players receive a return of
0.5. However, since all of them can observe the information of every other player, all
of the participants will know that the average return of the first period is 0.25 in the
first stage. With this knowledge, it is worthwhile for them to stay in this game since
the expectation return is positive. Thus, no one will quit the game at the second
round.
(3) Each player shares their outcome information with three other participants
in their social network. In this situation, each player can make decisions based on
five players’ outcome history. To simplify the discussion, we assume that there is
no relationship between any two players whose equipment broke, and no common
member is shared among any two players with broken equipment. Then, 40 partic-
ipants will observe 1 player with 10 failures, and 3 players with 5 successes and 5
failures each. To these 40 players, they will witness an expectation return of −0.125
after the first round. Hence, even players who had positive outcomes in the first
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period will quit the game in the second round because of the negative information
gained from the related player. Since there is a network externality, the expectation
return of the second round game for the other 60 players is −0.5 each. This negative
experience will cause a further avalanche in the third stage, i.e., every player will
refuse entering in the third round of the Dig Gold Game.
Is an avalanche inevitable under the limited information aggregation model if
an exogenous shock is experienced? The answer is no. Actually, several important
factors shall be taken into consideration: the shock intensity; the social structure;
and the shape of the network externality function f(·). Firstly, if the shock intensity
is not strong enough to cause a wide-spread panic to exit the game, then the
network externality in the following decision period will not be strong enough to
trigger a market collapse. Let’s look back to the previous dig gold game example.
If only one player suffers from an equipment breakdown in the first round, only 4
players will quit the game in the second round, but this will not cause an avalanche
since the expectation return of the other 96 players remains positive.
Secondly, we found that the social structure is of paramount importance to
the stability of a certain market. To illustrate, consider once again the previous
example. Compared with the third situation where every participant is linked
to a limited amount of players, the non-information aggregation situation (first
situation) is relatively stable. However, the second situation that allows access to
each player’s information proves to be even more stable than the first situation,
which is corresponding to the conclusion of Gunay (2008).
Finally, whether a collapse will be triggered or not also depends on the shape
of f(·). For example, if f(·) is concave, the network externality generated by the
absence of those shocked receivers may be so small that p f ( mM ) < c still exists.
Therefore, a sudden market collapse is unlikely, and it is even more possible that
the market will generally recover to an equilibrium state. On the other hand, if f(·)
is convex, the shock receivers that exit can thereby trigger an avalanche since the
expectation return of selecting I N in this situation is negative.
Though we do not provide a complete analytical solution to the collapse pro-
cedure due to the many factors that could be considered, we find that a collapse
may occur even when the underlying fundamentals actually favor investment
(i.e., the expectation return of investment remains positive). We find that the
avalanche occurs because the limited access of information between players in
our model boosts the collapse procedure in two ways: firstly, it will cause the “Pass
Effect” and secondly, it will cause investors who receive negative information to
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overestimate the severity of the shock and exit an otherwise optimal market. In
other words, imperfect information increased the likelihood of a market collapse.
5 Simulation and Analysis
In this section, we will use programming methods to analytically simulate our
model and examine the collapse procedure of the market. This Section will consist
of three subsections. First, we will illustrate how vulnerable markets enter and
maintain a relatively stable status when there exists no exogenous shock, and
we will also show market responses that suffer from sudden shocks that affect a
number of participants. Secondly, we will examine how the different factors in
our model affect the stability of the market, e.g., the fixed cost, the probability of
winning or the number of people who suffer from a sudden shock. Finally, we will
research the influence of different social network structures, and we will compare
our model to those of Jeitschko and Taylor (2001) and Gunay (2008).
5.1 TheMarket Collapse Procedure
Consider a market of 400 participants who form a square array social network
(20×20). Each player has a standing relationship with the bordering four players.
If a player is on the edge of the square, the relationship extends to players on the
other side of the row or column. For example, the player whose coordinates are
(0,0) has four neighbor players, being (0,1), (1,0), (0,19), (19,0).
In this simulation, we set the return function as below:
U (mτ)=
{
mτ
400 −0.52 if WIN
−0.52 if LOSE
In this function, mτ represents the number of participants in this decision
period. We set the winning probability of p to 0.7. When there is an exogenous
shock, 10% of investors in this market will be influenced, i.e., 40 participants in
this case. We assume that there are 10 transactions during each decision period.
We use the Hinton diagram to display our result. A sample of the Hinton diagram
is shown below:
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Figure5.1 A sample of Hinton diagram when the market suffers from an exogenous
shock.
In Figure 5.1, each small square represents an investor in this market. The white
square represents a player that has profited in this decision period, while the black square
implies a loss. The area of the small square represents the net profit (net loss) during
this period. If a square is nonexistent for a certain investor, it indicates that this player
did not select I N for this decision period (like the player (13,15)). If there is a blue dot
in the coordinate, it implies that this player will select I N for the next decision period.
Otherwise, he will choose OU T . An orange dot implies that this player suffered from a
shock during this period, which brings his winning probability down to zero.
Figure 5.2 below displays a typical market collapse procedure. The x-axis represents
the decision periods, while the y-axis represents the number of investors that select I N in
any period. We introduce a shock at the 201st period and 601st period. There is a small
trough beginning in the 200th period and a market collapse at the 600th period. This
graph clearly displays that the market is fluctuating around an equilibrium value of about
395 during the periods between 0 to 200 and 200 to 600, which supports our previous
proposition in Section 3 that the market will converge to a relatively prosperous status for
a long period of time when there is no further outside shocks.
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Figure5.2 Time - players number graph.
To better illustrate how the market survived from the exogenous shock at the 200th
period until the market collapse procedure at the 600th period, we display the panel data
of all investors around these two shocks in the following Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4.
Figure5.3 Top left: period 200; top middle: period 201; top right: period 202. Bottom
left: period 203; bottom middle: period 204; bottom right: period 205.
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Figure5.4 Top left: period 600; top middle: period 601; top right: period 602. Bottom
left: period 603; bottom middle: period 604.
Figure 4.3 illustrates how a market resisted the shock at period 201. Observe how the
40 random investors who suffered from an exogenous shock exited the market at period
202 (top right graph of figure 4.3) since their winning probability was brought down to
zero. However, this downtrend did not further occur in the following several periods:
in fact, exiting investors returned to the market at periods 203 and 204 and the market
returned to its original level of stableness at period 205.
Figure 5.4, however, shows a different result. It clearly illustrates how a market
avalanche happens under an exogenous shock. Again, 40 random investors suffered
from a shock at period 601. Differing from Figure 5.3, this shock successfully triggered the
domino effect in the following periods: the shock caused a huge loss for some investors
in the market (period 601); their loss frightened the players bordering them and caused
many of their neighbors to then exit the market as well (period 602); the initial exit of a
majority of investors decreased the payoff function of the remaining I N players, which
resulted in a wide-range loss (period 603); since no one could earn a profit in the market,
the market collapsed (period 604).
From this example, we show that we cannot prove whether or not “there will be a
collapse” or “there will not be a collapse” in our model. Actually the market behavior
follows a complex stochastic process and we only know under which circumstance the
market is more likely to collapse. In the following part we will use the Monte-Carlo method
to estimate the expected probability of collapse under a different combination of factors,
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which then leads to different expectations and outcomes. In this way our model discovers
how different causation factors affect the stability of a specific market.
5.2 Factor Analysis
In this section, using the market simulating program, we examine the gradients of the
collapse probability Pc with fixed costs c , winning probability p, the number of transaction
periods within a decision period k and the number of investors suffers from a shock N s.
Figure 5.5 displays the relationship between the probability of a collapse and fixed
costs when other factors are fixed. In this figure, the winning probability p is set at 70%
and every investor trades 10 times in each decision period, with 40 out of 400 investors
suffering from a shock. We set the interval of c as 0.49 < c < 0.54, and we pick up 26
points of c within this interval with a step length of 0.002. To better estimate the collapse
probability of a given c, we repeat the collapse procedure 500 times for each c point.
Figure5.5 Correlations between the collapse probability and fixed transaction cost
A detailed examination on this figure reveals an extreme sensitivity of a collapse
probability to the fixed transaction cost. The collapse probability tends to be zero when
fixed cost is 0.51, yet the probability tends to be 1 when a fixed transaction cost equals
0.54. There is a varying collapse probability within a narrow interval of the fixed cost c.
Such observation implies that even a tiny rise in the fixed transaction cost will lead to an
unstable market status and increases the likelihood of a collapse under a shock.
Figure 5.6 shows the overall trends of a collapse probability to the number of transac-
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tion times within a decision period when other factors are fixed. The winning probability
is set at 70%, 40 out of 400 investors suffer from a shock, and the fixed cost of every
transaction is set to 0.52. In this figure, the x-axis represents the transaction times within a
decision period which varies from 4 to 18, and the y-axis denotes the collapse probability
of a certain market. We set a 500 times repeating game to estimate the collapse probability
of each given k.
Figure5.6 Correlations between the probability of collapse and the number of trans-
action times
The figure above shows that there exists a generally negative relationship between
the number of transaction times within a decision period and the collapse probability.
Yet, we also observe several fluctuations at k = 10,12,15and17, which is resulted from
the discontinuity of binominal distribution and is previously proved in LEMMA 2. This
downward trend relation coincides with an agent’s intuition: since the expectation return
of each transaction is positive when less people quit, a higher number of transaction
times means that each investor in the market is more likely to receive a positive return
after the decision period, which leads to a more stable market status and the collapse
probability tends to be valued at zero when each investor trades multiple times within a
decision period.
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Figure5.7 The relationship between the number of investors who suffer from a shock
and the collapse probability
Figure 4.7 displays the correlation between the number of investors that suffer from
a shock with the probability of a market collapse. The fixed cost is set at 0.52, while the
winning probability is 0.7 and in this case, every investor trades 10 times within a decision
period. The number of suffering investors various from 20 to 60 in this simulation and
the step length is 2. To better estimate the accuracy of the market collapse probability, we
play a 500 times repeated game for each point in this graph.Obviously, the figure shows a
clear uptrend relationship between the number of investors experiencing the shock and
the collapse probability. The more people that are influenced by the market shock, the
more investors - not only shocked investors, but also neighboring players - will become
frightened and exit the market. As a result, the market completely collapses.
Figure 5.8 below displays the negative trend between the winning probability and
market collapse probability. The step length is 0.01 and we hold other factors fixed as in
our previous figures. The sudden rapid downturn shown in Figure 4.8 implies that the
winning probability is vitally important to the market’s stability, similar to the affects fixed
costs had. This conclusion also fits with our intuition that when people have a higher
chance of winning in a certain market, their return expectation will grow as a reasonable
result and fewer participants will exit the market even though the market is suffering from
a shock.
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Figure5.8 Correlation between the winning probability and collapse probability
5.3 Social Structure andModel Comparison
In this section, we will change the structure of the social network in our model to simply
analyze how different social networks can affect the stability of a certain market. Then we
will compare our simulation results to the predictions in a number of theoretical models
from Jeitschko and Taylor (2001) and Gunay (2008).
In previous sections, we used an uncomplicated social structure that everyone in the
market has four neighboring friends and with whom they share transaction information
to. We will extend this model to a more complex situation: each investor is randomly
given a group of people to share their trading information with, and another group of
random people whom they receive outcome information from. Consider a market with
400 participants and each player can receive the information of k other players. The fixed
cost of each transaction is 0.5, the winning probability p is held at 0.7 and 40 out of 400
players suffer from an exogenous shock at period 200, 600 and 800. The Figure 5.9 below
will show a typical time - players number graph when k = 0,1,2,3,4 and 399.
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Figure5.9 Top left: k=0; top middle: k=1; top right: k=2. Bottom left: k=3; Bottom
middle: k=4; Bottom right: k=399.
It is clearly shown from Figure 5.9 that as each market member receives more infor-
mation from other players, the more stable the market is. Consider the top left graph of
the above panel k = 0 situation. The market collapse happens unexpectedly fast, only
within a few periods even though selecting I N creates Nash equilibrium for every mar-
ket participant. In this case, every participant can only observe their own information
and no one will re-enter the market as a result. Such a market avalanche procedure
is thoroughly analyzed and predicted by Jeitschko and Taylor (2001). When k = 1, the
collapse procedure slows down because of the information aggregation, however the
market also collapses in a short period of time. The k = 2 situation is relatively robust
since it experienced a longer period of prosperousness from period 0 to 200, yet, a shock
at period 200 destroyed the market in this case.
Consider the graph of k = 3 and k = 4. They both show stability when facing a shock.
Nevertheless, the case of k = 4 has less volatility than the case of k = 3, which implies that
the more players one can observe information from, the more stable the market is. An
extreme example is shown in the case of the bottom right graph in which each player can
observe every trading outcome within the market, which is discussed by Gunay (2008). In
this case, the market is extremely stable and even the influence of shocks is dismissed by
the information aggregation and in result, our research highly supports the idea of Gunay
(2008) that the information aggregation procedure will lead to a more stable market.
Zheng Gong Writing Sample 22
A SimpleModel of Metastable Market
6 Conclusion
The limited information aggregation market collapse model in this paper is innovative
in some respect. To begin with, we have proved that under the circumstance of limited
information aggregation and internet externality, it is possible for a market to remain in
a metastable status for a long period of time. Moreover, a market collapse may happen
when there exists an exogenous shock that only influences a small number of investors
in the market. Specifically, this collapse can happen even if selecting IN creates Nash
equilibrium for each participant at a given decision period.
We present analytical derivations to analyze the mechanism of a market’s metastable
status and market’s collapse. To better illustrate our model and analyze the influence
of different factors, we use programming methods to simulate the relationship between
different factors and collapse probability. Additionally, we compared our work to previous
works in this area, such as Jeitschko and Taylor (2001) and Gunay (2008), which helps
prove the applicability of our model.
There are several ways to extend our analysis. The first is to apply an everyday
social network occurrence into the model. Secondly, it is worthwhile to consider the
situation that investors are risk averters or low level-k rationality types. Finally, it would be
interesting to consider how the collapse of a market negatively influences outside markets
and how a world-wide crisis could happen under such a mechanism. We hope that our
work provides future reference for further research in this field.
Appendix
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
(1) Assume A(N |k, p) denotes the probability of NW I N s within k rounds, and A(N |k, p)
corresponds to a binominal distribution, then:
B(N |k, p)=
N∑
i=0
A(i |k, p)
and we have:
A(i |k+1, p)= A(i |k, p)× (1−p)+ A(i −1|k, p)×p
, if i > 0
Spefically, if i = 0, then:
A(0|k+1, p)= A(0|k, p)× (1−p)
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Then,
B(N |k+1, p)=
N∑
i=0
A(i |k+1, p)=
N∑
i=0
A(i |k, p)× (1−p)+
N−1∑
i=0
A(i |k, p)×p
And we have:
B(N |k+1, p)=B(N −1|k, p)+ A(N |k, p)× (1−p)=B(N |k, p)− A(N |k, p)×p
Since A(N |k−p)> 0, B(N |k+1, p)<B(N |k, p) if and only if N (k+1)=N (k).
(2) If N (k+1)=N (k)+1, then we need to compare A(N+1|k+1, p) with A(N |k, p)×p
Suppose A(N +1|k+1, p)> A(N |k, p)×p, then:
(k+1)!
(N +1)!(k−N )! p
N+1(1−p)k−N > k !
N !(k−N )! p
N (1−p)k−N ×p
Which means:
(k+1)!
(N +1)!(k−N )! >
k !
N !(k−N )!
Then we have k+1>N +1, which is contradict to our basic assumption. Hence, we
have proved that if N (k+1)=N (k)+1, F (k+1)> F (k).
(3) Since p > c, according to laws of large numbers, we have:
lim
k→∞
E(B(k, p))= lim
k→∞
k× (p− c)→∞
Since binominal distribution converges to normal distribution when limk→∞, and we
have B(N |k, p) represents the probability that B(k, p)< 0, we have:
lim
k→∞
B(N |k, p)= 0.
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